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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

GLORIA HAYLEY ASHBY,
CASE NO. 20080737-SC

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
DALLEN BEN ASHBY,
Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
This Court issued a writ of certiorari in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Whether the court of appeals was correct in reversing the trial
court's dismissal of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court gives the lower court's ruling no
deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v.
St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
ISSUE 2: Whether the court of appeals was correct in reversing the trial
court's dismissal of Plaintiff s unjust enrichment claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court gives the lower court's ruling no
deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St Benedict's Dev. Co. v.
St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) - Addendum A
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 - Addendum B
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Gloria Hayley Ashby ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint for divorce in the

Third District Court on October 11, 2007. In addition to pleading a cause of action
for divorce, the complaint alleged that Dallen Ben Ashby ("Defendant") had
breached his contract with Plaintiff and was therefore liable for damages.

2

2.

On April 12, 2006, the court entered a bifurcated decree of divorce,

reserving all other issues for trial.
3.

On August 18, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs

contract claim.
4.

On August 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a

claim for unjust enrichment and filed her response to the motion to dismiss.
5-

On September 27, 2006, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties,

the case was transferred to the Fourth District Court where it was assigned case
number 064402051 (the "divorce action55).1

The divorce action went to trial on December 12, 2007, where the sole issue was
alimony, all other issues having been resolved by stipulation. The trial court
ordered that no alimony be awarded even though it specifically found that
Defendant was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage and even though it found
that he would be making and unknown but substantial income within a few years
from the date of the trial. See Memorandum Decision, Case No. 064402051 (copy
attached hereto as Addendum C) ("Memorandum Decision55) at 3-4. Thereafter,
Plaintiff appealed the trial court's order and judgment. That appeal has been fully
briefed and was scheduled for oral argument before the Utah Court of Appeals on
February 25, 2009. In response to Plaintiffs filing a suggestion for certification,
however, the court of appeals stayed all proceedings in that case (including the
scheduled oral argument) until resolution of this appeal and denied the suggestion
to certify.
Plaintiff submits that certification of the divorce action appeal to this Court so that
that case may be considered together with this one would make sense. Indeed, the
court below stated:
In terms of judicial economy, the contract and unjust enrichment
claims grow out of the same nucleus of facts and should be considered
together, one place or another. And any real difficulty is avoided in
3

6.

On October 11, 2006, oral argument on the motion to dismiss was

heard by Commissioner Thomas Patton, at which time he recommended that the
motion to dismiss be granted. Specifically, the Commissioner ruled that, under
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985), contract and unjust enrichment
claims must be filed separately from a divorce action.
7.

On December 11, 2006, the court (Judge Howard) adopted the

commissioner's recommendation and dismissed from the divorce action the breach
of contract and unjust enrichment claims for improper joinder. This order was not
appealed.
8.

Based on that dismissal, on December 22, 2006, Plaintiff re-filed her

breach of contract and unjust claims as a separate action in a new complaint
("Complaint"). (R. 1-5.)
9.

On January 22, 2007, Defendant filed am answer to the Complaint and

a motion to dismiss. (R. 6-7, 32-34.)

this case because the same judge who handled the divorce case was
also assigned the instant case and thus had "the big picture."
Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App 25, ^f 5 n.l. Although the court of appeals was
incorrect in its assertion that this case and the divorce case were before the same
trial judge who therefore had the "big picture," the court's legal analysis was
correct. Having one court consider both of these cases together can only assist in
arriving at the proper resolution.

4

10.

On March 6, 2007, the trial court (Judge Hansen), after briefing but

without a hearing, issued a memorandum ruling granting the motion to dismiss. (R.
61-65.)
11.

On April 12, 2006, the trial court signed the order dismissing

Plaintiffs Complaint and thus terminated the case in the trial court. (R. 68-70.)
12.

On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal. (R. 71-73.)

13.

After full briefing and oral argument, on July 3, 2008, the Utah Court

of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision as to both the breach of contract and
unjust enrichment claims and remanded them for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 6, 1997, and

remained so until April 12, 2006, when the Third District Court (Judge Terry
Christiansen) granted a bifurcated decree of divorce. Complaint ^f 5.
2.

Prior to and during their marriage, Defendant requested that Plaintiff

work and support him during the years that he was obtaining his undergraduate and
medical degrees. In return, Defendant promised to provide for and support

2

Because, as discussed hereafter, the Court is required to accept as true the facts
pleaded in the Complaint when considering the propriety of a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), the facts stated herein are taken directly from Plaintiffs
Complaint. All references to the Complaint are referring to R. 1-5.

5

Plaintiff thereafter at a certain level with the income he would earn as the holder of
a medical degree. Complaint | f 8, 13.
3.

Defendant further requested that Plaintiff forego an opportunity

presented to her to take over an ongoing, successful business so that she could
accompany him to Missouri while he attended medical school. Complaint % 14.
4.

Defendant further requested Plaintiff forego or delay indefinitely her

efforts to earn her bachelors degree. Complaint ^ 15.
5.

Defendant further requested Plaintiff to live at a lower standard of

living than would otherwise have been necessary during the period of his
education, both undergraduate and graduate. Complaint f 16.
6.

Plaintiff agreed to each of these requests because of her

understanding, based upon communications with Defendant, that these sacrifices
would allow him to earn a much higher income and that she would be the
beneficiary thereof. Complaint ^J17. In other words, Plaintiff accepted
Defendant's offer and fully performed her obligations under the bargain by
working and providing support for Defendant during his educational years.
Complaint ^ 9.
7.

During their marriage and as a result of Plaintiff s contributions and

sacrifices, Defendant obtained a medical degree and is now in the process of

6

beginning a career in radiology, in which he can be expected to earn a substantial
income for the rest of his working life. Complaint f 18.
8.

Defendant breached his obligation to Plaintiff in that as soon as he

finished medical school and obtained his degree, he stopped supporting Plaintiff.
Indeed, through various acts and omissions on his part, Defendant has made it
intolerable for Plaintiff to continue to reside with him, thus preventing his fulfilling
of his obligations by means of living together as husband and wife. Complaint

lio.
9.

By foregoing specific opportunities presented to her, by working to

earn an income to support Defendant, and by giving up a higher standard of living,
Plaintiff conferred a benefit on Defendant. Complaint ^ 19.
10.

Defendant was fully aware of the conferral of this benefit at all times

relevant hereto. Complaint ^j 20.
11.

Plaintiff did not confer this benefit officiously or gratuitously or solely

for her own benefit. Moreover, the benefit to Defendant was direct and intentional,
not merely incidental to some other action. Complaint f 21.
12.

The circumstances surrounding the conferral of this benefit were such

that it would be unjust to allow Defendant to retain the benefit conferred by
Plaintiff without compensating Plaintiff therefore. In particular, Plaintiff conferred
this benefit on Defendant at great personal effort and sacrifice, including foregoing

7

her own business and educational opportunities, some of which are now lost
forever. Complaint ^f 22.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Defendant had not shown that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her breach
of contract or unjust enrichment claims, Plaintiff asks this Court to affirm the
decision of the court of appeals which reversed the trial court decision granting
Defendant's motion to dismiss. Indeed, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges facts that are
sufficient to establish viable claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
Thus, because this Court must consider the allegations in the Complaint as being
true in its consideration of the lower courts' decisions, the appellate court's ruling
should be affirmed.
The Complaint establishes a viable breach of contract claim because it
alleges: (1) There was an agreement between the parties to the effect that if
Plaintiff supported Defendant during his medical school studies, Defendant would
thereafter support Plaintiff with the niceties of life that go with the substantial
income that would result from the medical degree; (2) Plaintiff performed all of her
obligations under the agreement by supporting Defendant during his medical
school studies; (3) Defendant breached the agreement by failing to support Plaintiff
since his graduation from medical school and has anticipatorily breached his
obligation to support her at income levels he will be earning after he finishes his

8

residency; and (4) Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer damages from
Defendant's breach of his obligations because Plaintiff is now forced to work full
time in a less lucrative career than she otherwise would have been able to, and will
not enjoy the level of income that Defendant promised her after he finishes his
residency and fellowship.
In addition, the facts of this case show starkly the limitations of alimony as a
method by which Defendant can perform his obligations under the contract and
cure the injustice inflicted on Plaintiff. It is only after he completes his residency,
shortly before the statutory alimony period will expire, that Defendant will be
earning a significant income. This will leave only a very short period within which
Defendant will be able to use alimony as a means of performing his contractual
obligation to support Plaintiff at the promised level of income.
Finally, the statute of frauds does not bar Plaintiffs breach of contract claim
for three separate reasons: first, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff had no
obligation to plead that the agreement between the parties complied with the
statute; second, the terms of the agreement did not require all performance of the
agreement to completed within one year, nor was it impossible that Plaintiffs
obligations be perfomied within one year; and, third, Plaintiff has at least partially
performed her obligations under the agreement, thereby taking the entire matter
outside the statute of frauds.

9

The Complaint also establishes a viable claim for unjust enrichment because
it alleges that (1) Plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant by supporting him
through medical school, (2) Defendant not only knew about and appreciated the
benefit but in addition bargained for it, and (3) Plaintiffs conferral of this benefit
on Defendant makes it unjust for Defendant to fail to compensate Plaintiff
therefore. Again, for the reasons stated above, alimony is an insufficient method
for Defendant to compensate Plaintiff for the benefit conferred upon him.
Thus, because Plaintiffs Complaint establishes viable claims for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, and because alimony is an insufficient method of
compensating Plaintiff under these claims and curing the injustice inflicted upon
her, the trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed as to both the breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARDS FOR ANALYZING A DISMISSAL UNDER RULE
12(b)(6)
It is basic procedural law that on a motion to dismiss, a court must consider

the allegations in the complaint as being true and must read those allegations in the
light most favorable to and with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. Fenn v. MLeads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 UT 8 f 2, 137 P.3d
706, 709 (Utah 2006). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) will be affirmed only if it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any
10

state of facts which could be proven in support of it claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves
& Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990). When reviewing a dismissal under
this rule, an appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as
true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that
the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim. Colman v. Utah
State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the
appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it under a
correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,
196 (Utah 1991).
D(.

THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS'
REVERSAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT STATES A VIABLE CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT
A.

The Facts Alleged in the Complaint Are Sufficient to Establish a
Breach of Contract Claim

The dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint should be reversed because it states a
viable claim for breach of contract. Under Utah law, the elements of a breach of
contract claim are: "(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery,
(3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom
Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20 ^ 14, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). In the instant
case, each of these elements is present,

11

First, the parties had a valid contract. The elements of a valid contract are
"proper subject matter, offer and acceptance, competent parties, and
consideration." Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193,
1197 (Utah App. 1992). There is nothing improper or unlawful about a man and a
woman making an agreement whereby one agrees to pay for the education of the
other in exchange for a certain financial compensation. Similarly, there is no issue
as to the competency of the parties to have entered into this agreement, which can
readily be inferred from the allegations of the Complaint. Next, Defendant offered
to provide Plaintiff with the niceties of life that go with the substantial income of a
medical doctor in exchange for her supporting him during his undergraduate and
medical studies. Complaint ^f 8. Plaintiff accepted this offer. Complaint f 9. The
terms of the offer and acceptance included mutual consideration. Specifically,
Plaintiff provided the consideration of agreeing to support Defendant through his
educational years. Complaint ^j 8. Similarly, Defendant agreed to support Plaintiff
thereafter at a significant level. Id. Accordingly, all the elements of a lawful valid
contract are present.
Second, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff performed her obligations under
the contract by supporting Defendant during his educational years. Complaint <[| 9.
Third, Defendant breached the contract by failing to support Plaintiff since
his graduation from medical school and has anticipatorily breached hus obligation

12

to support her at the income levels he will be earning after he finishes his
residency. Complaint f 10.
Finally, Plaintiff has suffered damages and will continue to suffer damages
from Defendant's breach of the contract. Complaint 111. Plaintiff is now
working full-time, not by choice, but because she has no other means of support.
Plaintiff will not enjoy the income that Defendant promised her. Although not
specifically pled in the Complaint, the Court should accept these facts as true
because they are reasonably inferable given the facts alleged in the Complaint.
Defendant asserts that there are numerous questions that suggest the alleged
contract must fail for lack of definiteness.
l

What if Husband chose to change careers? What if chose to work for
a job that generated less income than expected? How long was Wife
to work - only while Husband was in school, during his internship
and/or residency, or until they had children? What was the level of
income promised by Husband to ensure he met the standard of living
contemplated by Wife?
Brief of Petitioner at 7-8/ Defendant, however, fails to acknowledge that this
matter arises based on the trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiff s
Complaint. The answers to each of these questions may, at this stage, be answered
by inferences, and the Court is obligated to accept only those inferences that favor
3

The case law cited by Defendant, Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169 and Stangl
v^ Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976), both held that the contracts before them were
unenforceable as insufficiently definite but did so only after taking evidence on the
matter, either as part of a summary judgment motion or after trial.

13

Plaintiff. Later, these questions will be answered by a trial and a record based
upon evidence, not Defendant's current speculations.
B.

The Martinez Decision is Not Relevant to the Viability of
Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim

Defendant's primary argument against Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is
that it is contrary to Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). In that case,
the supreme court rejected the claim that a working spouse should receive
"equitable restitution" to compensate her for her contributions to the marriage
while her husband was pursuing higher education. That case, however, is wholly
distinguishable from that now before this Court. First, in Martinez there was no
breach of contract claim presented. As shown above, not only is Plaintiff seeking a
remedy for breach of contract, she has adequately pled that claim. Second, in
Martinez, there was no allegation of an agreement that the working spouse would
do certain specific things to enable the student spouse to complete his education.
Again, this case is different in that Plaintiff has proffered such allegations.
Indeed, the only basis Defendant raises for even considering the Martinez
case in connection with Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is the Martinez court's
discussion of marriage in general. See, e.g., Martinez, 818 P.2d at 540 ("Although
marriage is a partnership in some respects, a marriage is certainly not comparable
to a commercial partnership.") This statement, however, cannot be understood tomean that there can never be a breach of contract claim by one spouse against
14

another. For instance, assume a situation where a doctor hired his spouse to work
in his office to manage the practice and oversee billing and other clerical matters
and agreed to pay a specific wage or salary. If Defendant's reading of Martinez
\

\

were correct, the spouse would have no recourse if the doctor failed to pay for the
work performed. The arguments that Plaintiff raises here will not apply to all
divorces because many, if not most, marriages do not have the
commercial/contractual nature that the Martinez court referred to. As in the
hypothetical situation just discussed, however, the parties in this case themselves
chose to import such concepts into their marriage. When both parties agree to such
an arrangement, the courts should not refuse to honor that choice. See, e.g.,
Dorsettv. Dorsett, 111 S.E. 541, 543 (N.C. 1922).
Defendant tries to skirt this issue by asserting a distinction between
agreements that are intrinsic to the marriage relationship and those that are
extrinsic:
Most agreements between spouses relate to decisions that are
intrinsic and commonplace to a marital relationship such as (1)
deciding how many children to have, (2) whether one or both spouses
will work, or (3) where to live.
However, there are some agreements extrinsic to a marital
relationship that spouses may enter together such as (1) a partnership
or business relationship, (2) an employer-employee relationship
between spouses, or (3) written financial arrangements between
spouses where separate property is involved as collateral or for
lending.

15

The fact of this case are essentially present in every marriage.
Spouses routinely discuss their individual and collective employment
or educational aspirations and take steps to achieve those goals.
Brief of Petitioner at 7. The record provides absolutely no basis for Defendant's
factual assertions here. Additionally, Defendant cites no authority for such a
distinction. Moreover, on their face these conclusions seem somewhat
contradictory. For instance, Defendant would have this Court believe that a
couple's decision as to whether the wife will work is intrinsic (and therefore not
the subject of a breach of contract claim) but whether she will work for the
husband is an extrinsic decision and therefore subject to the full panoply of legal
remedies. One might pity the trial court that would have to apply the distinction
between those decisions that intrinsic and those that are extrinsic.
Defendant also asserts two additional holdings of the Martinez case, i.e.,
(1) that an award of "equitable restitution" would be too speculative, and (2) that a
person's educational degree may not be divided as marital property in a divorce.
Brief of Petitioner at 9, 10. These assertions also fell short. First, it is certainly
possible that in a particular case an agreement may be too speculative to support a
judgment of breach of contract. That does not mean that we throw out the entire
claim on the pleadings before a trial has been held or even before any discovery is
had. Whether a particular claim is too speculative is a question of fact, not one of
pleading.

16

Second, even though the courts will not grant a divorcing a spouse an
interest in her husband's educational degree, that does not preclude a contractual
right to such an interest. Two men may agree that one will support the other in his
graduate education on condition that the other will repay the favor by paying to the
one a percentage of the other's income for a specific number of years after
graduation. These two men may even set a minimum annual payment to ensure
that the one does not avoid his obligation by not fully exploiting his training and
education. Defendant has provided no reason that such an arrangement would be
permissible between to male friends but not between spouses.
While it may be true under Martinez that a marriage relationship standing
alone will be insufficient to create a right to "equitable restitution," the relationship
between Plaintiff and Defendant was not so limited. Neither should Plaintiffs
available remedies. The import of the trial court's dismissal can be understood by
further comparing the facts of this case with those of the hypothetical in the
I
previous paragraph. In that situation, if the individual that received the assistance
failed to make the repayments, the other party would have a clear claim for breach
of contract. This means that Defendant is actually asserting marriage as a defense
to breach of contract.4 That is surely not what the Martinez court intended.

That this is Defendant's true aim is witnessed by the fact that nowhere in his
motion to dismiss papers, his briefing before the court of appeals, nor in his
17

While it may be true that there are no published decisions from Utah courts
holding that marriage is not a defense to a breach of contract claim, that does not
mean there are no decisions available to give guidance to the Court. In particular,
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. App. 1982), is especially
helpful. That case presented the court with a situation similar to that before this
Court: The wife agreed to "'put him through three years of law school without his
having to work, and when he finished, he would put [her] through for [her] masters
degree without [her] having to work.'5' Id at 349, 661 P.2d at 199 (alterations in
original). After the husband graduated from law school and after the couple had
deferred her education an additional two years due to his income shortfall, he told
her that he wanted a divorce.
The wife included breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims in her
divorce petition. After trial, the trial court found in favor of the wife on both
claims and the husband appealed. On appeal, the court reversed the breach of
contract claim. Specifically, the court held that the evidence presented at trial
failed to establish the terms of the contract with sufficient definiteness. Id. at 350,
661 P.2d at 200. Specifically, the agreement as proven at trial did not specify

opening brief before this Court did Defendant even identify the elements necessary
to plead a prima facie case of breach of contract (or of unjust enrichment).
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when or where the wife would attend graduate school or how long her graduate
program would take to complete. Id. at 350-51, 661 P.2d at 200-0L5
It is important to note what the Pyeatte court did not hold - that breach of
contract claims in a marriage context are not legally recognized. If, as Defendant
suggests, such an action could not be pursued, the Pyeatte court would have
dismissed on those grounds rather than looking to whether the terms of the contract
Were sufficiently definite, a fact-specific inquiry.
The Martinez court did not even pretend to address the issues presented by
this case. Indeed, the Martinez court stated explicitly that it was limiting its
I
I
analysis to whether the law recognizes "equitable restitution." Martinez, 818 P.2d
at 538 ("This case is here on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to
review the single issue of whether that court erred in fashioning a new remedy in
divorce cases which it called equitable restitution and which may be awarded in
addition to alimony, child support, and property." (emphases added)); id. at 543
("We granted certiorari solely on the issue of equitable restitution and denied
5

The Pyeatte court also rejected the wife's claim that she should be awarded a
larger share of the marital estate because the husband took with him an asset- his
legal degree and license - obtained with marital property. The court followed
Arizona precedent holding that educational degrees and licenses are not property.
Id. at 351-52, 661 P.2d at 201-02 (citing Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d
115 (Ariz. App. 1981)). Because this Court has previously reached the same
conclusion, see Martinez, 818 P.2d at 541-42, Plaintiff has not made this type of
claim in the divorce action.
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certiorari on all other issues." (emphases added)). The Court should not view itself
as bound in anyway by that decision. Instead, the Court should view this case as
one of first impression in this state.
C.

Defendant Cannot Perform His Contractual Obligations Through
the Payment of Alimony

Defendant also argues that the remedy for Defendant's breaches must be
limited to that found in Utah Code 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii). That provision provides the
divorce court shall, in determining whether to award alimony and the amount
thereof, consider the contributions one spouse made to the other's education and
earning power during the marriage. Brief of Petitioner at 7, 11-12, 14-15. The
facts of this case, however, show starkly the limitations of alimony as a method by
which Defendant can perform his contractual obligations and cure the injustices
inflicted on Plaintiff.
First, Defendant's brief makes it appear that in the natural course of things,
Plaintiff will be awarded, as part of the alimony to be awarded to her in connection
with her divorce, all she is entitled to for her claims in the Complaint. Defendant
fails to acknowledge that he fought any award of alimony to Plaintiff and, at least
in the trial court, he was wholly successful. The Utah divorce statute is simply no
guarantee that a spouse who specifically contracts for a certain compensation will
be granted that compensation through divorce; the vagaries of divorce proceedings
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are too incalculable to require spouses to rely solely on that to protect their
expectations.
Making it even worse, by statute, a court may not, absent "extenuating
circumstances/' impose an alimony obligation extending beyond the length of the
marriage at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h). A review of case law on this
subject shows only one appellate case where an award of alimony extending
beyond the length of the marriage was approved. In Kelley v. Kelley, 2003 UT
App 317, 79 P.3d 428 (Utah App. 2003), the court held that the trial court was
justified in finding extenuating circumstances to allow such an award of alimony.
I

I

The specific circumstances were that the parties had been married for fourteen
years which ended in a "sham divorce" (i.e., for financial reasons only). After this
divorce, the parties continued to live together in a common law marriage
relationship. The wife then filed for divorce. The trial court found that although
the length of the second marriage was only five years, the alimony should be based
on the length of the entire relationship. The court of appeals affirmed:
holding that under the unusual facts of this case the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding extenuating circumstances where, after
what was essentially a sham divorce, the parties continued to live in
exactly the same factual situation as they had previously. Conversely,
in the somewhat more usual, but still comparatively rare,
circumstance of a couple divorcing, reconciling later, and remarrying,
there would not be, without more, the requisite extraordinariness.
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Id. at f 7, n.3, 79 P.3d 430. Thus, even the relatively unusual circumstance of two
parties divorcing, reconciling, marrying, and divorcing again will not constitute
extenuating circumstances. It is far from certain that the appellate courts will
approve a finding of extenuating circumstances when faced with uthe not
uncommon" situation, see Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis.2d 1, 7, 318 N.W.2d
918, 921 (Wis. 1982), of a divorce happening at the end of significant graduate
studies in breach of various promises of future support.
The statutory limitation on alimony is significant in this case because for the
next three or four years, Defendant's income is expected to remain fairly modest.
It is only after he completes his residency, shortly before the statutory alimony
period will expire, that Defendant would be earning significant amounts. This will
leave only a very short period within which Defendant could use alimony as a
means to perform his contractual obligations and repay Plaintiff for the debt which
he has incurred. Moreover, any such alimony would cease should Plaintiff remarry
or cohabitate, even though Defendant would be free to do so without consequence.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8), -5(9).
Defendant relies heavily on the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Of
course, nowhere does that statute (or any other statute) state that it is to be the
exclusive remedy between divorcing spouses and that any contract or other legal or
equitable claim between the two parties are preempted by the statute.
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The Court should not leave Plaintiff subject to both the inherent and
unpredictable limits of alimony. Rather, justice requires that the spouse that has
I
performed such services for her student spouse not be left out in the cold, while the
|
I
student spouse goes on to enjoy the fruits of both their labors, especially where the
I

latter spouse expressly agreed to the contrary. Instead, the non-breaching spouse
should be granted the benefit of her bargain, which, in this case, requires more than
she might be able to obtain under alimony.
D.

Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim Is Not Barred by the Statute
of Frauds

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs breach of contract claim on the basis that
it was barred by the statute of frauds.6 Specifically, it relied on Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-5-4(1 )(a), which states in pertinent part:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the
party to be charged with the agreement: . . . (a) every agreement that
by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making of
the agreement....

6

Although Defendant pressed this point strongly before the trial court and the
court of appeals, in his opening brief before this Court, he has dropped this
argument to little more than a mention. Brief of Petitioner at 1. Accordingly, the
Court should consider this argument waived. American Towers Owners Ass'n. v.
CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by
an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.") In the event the Court actually
considers this argument, Plaintiff presents the following argument.
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1).' There are three reasons, one procedural and two
substantive, why this provision cannot be used to support the dismissal of
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim in this case.
1.
The Statute of Frauds Is an Affirmative Defense that Need
Not Be Pleaded by Plaintiff
Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that when pleading a
claim for relief, the pleader must include "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As noted above in Section 2.A.,
Plaintiff has done that by pleading each of the elements of a breach of contract
claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has complied with the pleading requirements
applicable to this case.
Because this appeal is addressing the propriety of a motion to dismiss, the
Court is limited to considering the pleadings only. At this stage, there are only two
ways that Defendant can assert the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant
violated the statute of frauds: (1) to point to an allegation in the Complaint
alleging that there was no writing memorializing the agreement, or (2) to impose
on Plaintiff an obligation to plead a disclaimer of a violation of the statute of
n

Although there are other statute of frauds provisions in the Utah Code that could
be argued to apply to this matter, the trial court did not rely on any of them.
Moreover, Defendant failed to argue any of these provisions before the court of
appeals. Any applicability of these provisions is thus waived. American Towers,
930 P.2d at 1185 n.5 ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and
abandoned.")
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frauds. As to the first, in this case:, i lotl lii ig in tl le Cot i lplaint can be cotistri led to
allege t.1 lat the agreement between the parties was not in writing. As to the second,
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly places on the party
responding to a prior pleading the burden of setting forth any of various affirmative
defenses, including statute frauds, statute of limitations, accord and satisfaction,
assumption of risk, etc. If Defendant's position were to be accepted, thei1 logic a 11)
Plaintiff woilid have been reci. ,;

•• rr..p.i •=
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Plaintiff and Defendant was in writing, but also that the statute of limitations had
not run, that there had been no accord and satisfaction, and that Plaintiff had not
assumed the risk. That is not the state of law.
The court of appeals was correct when it concluded that, in order for
Defendant to prevail on his Rule 12(b)(6) motion with respect to an affirmative
defense, he must show that there is a facial deficiency in the Complaint. Ashby v.
Ashby, 2008 U i App ZJ, *|| 10 (citing Heiner v. d.J. Groves & Sons Co,, 790 P.2d
107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). He has not done so and this argument should be
rejected.
2.

' '

Plaintiffs Contract with Defendant Does Not Come Within
the Statute of Frauds

Next, tl lis provisioi i oi il> applies to a cot ltract "tl lat by its tei m. s is i lot tc I: • z

performed within one year.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(a) (emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court, interpreting this one-year-requirement, has
25

stated that "[t]he question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual
performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the
reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed
within one year." Warner v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 434 (1896).
Thus, this provision plainly establishes that the requirement of a writing does not
apply unless "by its terms" the contract "requires" that the agreement not be
performed in one year.
Utah case law in accordance with the Warner decision. In Pasquin v.
Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, 988 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1999), the court stated: "we
reiterate the well-settled proposition that the one-year clause applies only to
contracts that are literally incapable of being performed within one year." See
1999 UT App 245 ^ 18, 988 P.2d at 6 (emphasis in original). There are a number
of cases establishing that even unexpected and highly unlikely occurrences that
might prevent the term of the contract from extending beyond one year are
sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Zion's Serv.
Corp. v. Danielson, 366 P.2d 982, 984-85 (Utah 1961) (holding that a contract
entered into by the individual members of an incorporated trade association was
not barred by the one year clause because each member of the corporation was free
to leave at any time and, thus, the agreement was capable of performance within
one year); Johnson v. Johnson, 88 P. 230, 231 (Utah 1906) (holding that, where the
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agreement was that the buyer of property would supply a per cei itage of tl ic ci ops to
the seller each year, the agreement was i lot barredfa)' the stati tie of frai ids becai lse
the seller could die within one year).
These cases establish that for the one-year-rule to bar a claim under the
statute of frauds, it must be impossible for the performance to be completed within
one year. In this case, it is clear that the parties' contract was not impossible to
fully perform within one year. Any number of things may have happened within
one yeai that would have ended the contract. For example, Defei idai it com ild 1: la ' e
voluntarily chosen not to continue his education; Defendant's poor academic
performance or medical circumstances could have rendered continuing his
education impossible or impracticable; Defendant may have been the victim of a
tragic accident or death which precluded additional education; or the parties may
have become financially unable to continue his education despite Plaintiffs efforts.
If for any of these reasons (or any other reason) Defendant 1: lad ceased his
edi icatioi lal pi ii si lits within oiu: ' :^ = Plaintiffs performance would have been
fulfilled.
That these occurrences were unlikely is not relevant. They are in no way
different than the possible death of the seller of the property in Johnson, which
may also have been unlikely. In addition, tl: mt these occurrences did i lot actually
happen is also irrelevant. Again,'

-ie question: 1 is i: lot w 1: lat the probable, oi:
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expected, or actual performance of the contract was, but whether the contract . . .
required that it should not be performed within one year. Warner, 164 U.S. at 434
(emphasis added).
Thus, because the terms of the contract do not require that performance not
to be rendered within one year, and because it was possible that performance could
be completed within one year, Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is not barred by
the statute of frauds. Therefore, because Plaintiffs Complaint states a viable claim
for breach of contract, and is not barred by the any version of the statue of frauds,
the dismissal of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim must be reversed.
3.

Even If the Statute Applied, Plaintiffs Partial Performance
Takes This Case Out of the Statute

Even if one were to assume that the statute of frauds applies to this particular
contract, there are a number of circumstances where the courts will enforce the
contract even though there was no required writing. In this case, the relevant
circumstance is Plaintiffs partial performance. To take an oral agreement out of
the statute of frauds, Plaintiff must show three things.
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; second, the
acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite;
and third, the acts must be in reliance on the contract.
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956).
In this case, Plaintiff has been given no opportunity to make the required
showings. There have been no depositions taken; there have been no
28

interrogatories promulgated

;
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bi lrdei i to establish the partial performance defense, she i i n ist be given an
opportunity to do so. The trial court's dismissal of the case denied her that
opportunity.
Indeed, this issue goes back to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard discussed above.
Under that standard, the claim may be dismissed only if the record establishes that
it is impossible for Plaintiff to prove any set of circumstances uiiuer •.-.•hu

;

^ '

might be granted. In this case, that means that before the claim may be dismissed,
the Court must be certain that, even if the statute of frauds applies, Plaintiff can in
no way prove a partial performance defense. On the record now before the Court,
the Court cannot reach such a conclusion.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS'
REVERSAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT ST A TES A VIABI ,E CLAIM FOR
IJNJT1ST ENRICHMENT
T

irt's dismissal of t— :1 w>

ti

allowed to stand because the Complaint states a viable claim for unjust enrichment.
The elements of such a claim are: 1) a benefit conferred on one person by another,
2) the person receiving the benefit must appreciate or have knowledge of the
benefit; and

the person receiving the benefits retains it under circumstances

making it unjust for him to retain it with- ]<
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the benefit. Deseret Miriah Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 2000 UT 83 \ 13, 12 P.3d 580,
582 (Utah 2000). Plaintiff has pled each element.
First, Defendant received his medical degree which was made possible
because of Plaintiff s efforts and sacrifices; that is, Plaintiff conferred this benefit
on Defendant. Complaint \ 18. Defendant was aware of this benefit during all
times while he was receiving it. Complaintfflf19-20. Finally, the circumstances of
Plaintiffs conferral of this benefit on Defendant make it unjust for Defendant to
retain the benefit without compensating Plaintiff therefor. Complaint \ 22. Again,
as shown above, because of the statutory limitations connected with alimony,
alimony is an insufficient means by which Defendant can compensate Plaintiff for
the benefit incurred upon him and remedy the injustice inflicted upon her.
Accordingly, Defendant cannot argue against Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim
except to assert that unjust enrichment cannot be found in the context of a marital
relationship, i.e., that marriage is again a defense to a claim.
Defendant relies on Martinez to defeat this claim as well as the breach of
contract claim discussed above. Again, Martinez is distinguishable. It did not
involve a specific promise by the working spouse to forego personal opportunities
and to provide for the student spouse in exchange for a specific promise by the
student spouse to provide future support at certain levels. Indeed, the facts of
Martinez are precisely the opposite: Mr. Martinez attended medical school over
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Mrs. Martinez's objection 818 I \2( 1 at 539. It istead. tl ic A iai tinez case ii I \ ol veil
oi lly a generic claim for divorce; il dul not involve a legally sufficient claim for
unjust enrichment. Moreover, the Martinez court limited its analysis to the
specific issue of "equitable restitution" then before it: "We granted certiorari
solely on the issue of equitable restitution and denied certiorari on all other issues.
We therefore express no opinion on the appropriateness of the other modifications
made by the Court of Appeals in the divorce decree." Id. at 543.
A

t!

• -ugh there is no Utah case addressing whether a clain I foi I inji list

enrichment can lie in the context of a married couple seeking a divorce, case law
from across the country does. For instance, the Pyeatte decision is again
instructive. After holding that the wife in that case could not recover on her breach
of contract case (for the case-specific reasons discussed above), the court turned to
o

her unjust enrichment claim. In addressing whether unjust enrichment is
appr-

v '

-

*"ext of the mar'1 <" r^nnonship, the coi ii t held tl lat

[wjhere both spouses perform the usual and incidental activities of the
marital relationship, upon dissolution there can be no restitution for
performance of those activities. [Citation omitted.] Where, however,
the facts demonstrate an agreement between the spouses and an
extraordinary or unilateral effort by one spouse which inures solely to
the benefit of the other by the time of the dissolution, the remedy of
restitution is appropriate.
The elements for such a claim under Arizona law are similar to those under Utah
law. Compare Pyeatte, 135 Ariz, at 202, 661 P.2d at 352 with Deseret Miriah,
2000 UT 83,^| 13, 12P.3dat582.
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Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. At 203, 661 P.2d at 353. In addressing the situation where the
spouse of a graduate student works to support the student, the court cited the
"emerging consensus" that "restitution to the working spouse is appropriate to
prevent unjust enrichment of the student spouse.55 Id. at 354-55 (citing cases);
accord In re Weinstein, 128 111. App. 3d 234, 241, 470 N.E.2d 551, 557 (111. App.
1984) (noting that although there is a "seeming divergence of opinion [among
various states] on the characterization of a degree or license, there is nevertheless
clear agreement that the contributing spouse should be entitled to some form of
compensation for the financial efforts and support provided to the student spouse
in the expectation that the marital unit would prosper in the future as a direct result
of the couple's previous sacrifices.55).
The trend is for courts to recognize the importance of avoiding a windfall to
the student spouse to the detriment of the working spouse. As the Kentucky Court
of Appeals acknowledged, "[a]s a matter of economic reality the most valuable
asset acquired by either party during this six-year marriage was the husband's
increased earning capacity. . . . In cases such as this, equity demands that courts
seek extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice.55 Inman v. Inman,
578 S.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Ky. App. 1979). Although the Inman court is correct
that this situation would justify "extraordinary remedies55 to avoid the injustice
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present* .* •• ;ah, the courts need look i 10 farthei 1:1 lai 1 tl ic 01 (ill lai y remedy • of
unjust enrichment.
Defendant argues, again based on Martinez, that the remedies Plaintiff seeks
are too speculative. Even setting aside the fact that Martinez is wholly
distinguishable from this case, the fact that damages may be speculative is not a
proper basis for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motic • • ic .\uininez court made its
decision after the case had been tried and the actual facts 1 lad beei 1 detern 111 led by
the trial court. It was not decided on a motion to dismiss where the court was
obligated to view fact and inference in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. This argument is, at best, premature and should be rejected.
Defendant again relies on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Specifically, he asserts
that with the post-Martinez amendments to that statute, there is no need for an
unjust enrichment claim. After all, the courts are directed "•

o .:,* "^ -M-- v

recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage." The facts of this case directly and starkly
contradict Defendant's argument. Despite the divorce action court's findings that
Defendant was at fault for the dissoh ition of tl le i nai i iage and that Plaintiff
contributed directly to Defendant's skill by paying for or allowing Defendai
attend school during the marriage (Memorandum Decision at 3-4, 5), the trial court

oo

JJ

awarded no alimony at all. If Defendant truly believed the arguments he is making
to this Court about the sufficiency of alimony, he would not have argued to the
trial court that no alimony should be awarded in this case. The alimony result in
this matter establishes beyond question the vagaries of divorce remedies as
compared to breach of contract and unjust enrichment remedies.
Finally, Defendant tries to undermine the foregoing analysis by citing the
decision in Kuder v. Schroeder 430 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. App. 1993). Defendant
argues that the rule of this case is to view the extraordinary efforts that Plaintiff
undertook and the deprivations she suffered should simply be viewed as "providing
income, domestic assistance, and other services." Brief of Petitioner at 13.
Defendant cites no authority that Utah accepts the rule that North Carolina applied
in that case. Moreover, as society has evolved and changed, we have learned that
treating women as the domestic help without equal rights before the law or in the
marital relationship does not serve society's interests. Defendant's ideas on this
subject are throwbacks to the 1950s, if not further. Even if one were to interpret
Defendant's position as only being that of spouses assisting each other in the
common manner that spouses often do, Plaintiffs efforts to put Defendant through
undergraduate and medical school went far beyond income and domestic
assistance. They included foregoing her own educational and professional
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opportunities and the accepting for a significant period of a lower stai ida i d of
living than would otherwise have been required.
Thus, because Plaintiffs Complaint establishes a viable claim for unjust
enrichment, its dismissal must be reversed.
IV.

REQUIRING SPOUSES TO COMPLY WITH THEIR EXPRESS
PROMISES WILL PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE INSTITUTION
OF MARRIAGE
Defendant argues that the Martinez case stands as a protectioi 1 of the

institution of marriage against its exploitation as primarily an econoi :i lie j :»iiit
venture. Brief of the Petitioner at 18-19. He expresses concern for the degradation
that marriage as an institution will suffer if Plaintiffs claims are allowed to
proceed. Id. at 19.
Such arguments ring hollow when the Martinez case is being used to excuse
the p!iilaiidering spouse from keeping the specific commitnv*
spouse tl mt lo;; ' all/y suppor

-
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at great personal sacrifice to herself. The true threat to marriage would be having
individuals know that their spouse's promises are wholly unenforceable.

It is

important to the institution that individuals realize that there are consequences if
they should fail to live up to their promises to their spouse, whether those are
traditional marital promises (the consequence therefor beim -f

— >

remedies of alimony, property division, and child support) or other promises that

35

are more akin to contracts.

It is such consequences that give individuals the

willingness to continue to work at the marital relationship even when things are
difficult.
For instance, in many cases, it will be very much in the interest of both
parties to a marriage for one of the spouses to seek a higher education. Such an
endeavor will of necessity require substantial personal sacrifices by the other
spouse (often the wife). If the wife knows that the husband will be able to leave
after the education is complete and not provide to her any of the benefits of that
education, it would be a rare wife willing to make those personal sacrifices. The
result of that would be that fewer marriages will have a spouse seeking a higher
education, even though it might be absolutely clear that such an education would
make both parties (and their family) better off.
If the Court truly wishes to protect the institution of marriage, it should
make it clear that spouses that make express commitments to each other will not be
able to avoid those commitments just by getting divorced (or by making life so
miserable for the spouse that the spouse has no reasonable alternative but to seek
divorce). A ruling in favor of Plaintiff will enhance the favor with which the State
of Utah treats marriage.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the
decision of the trial court, reinstate the claims in her Complaint, thereby allowing
Plaintiff the opportunity to proceed forward in the normal course with her claims.
DATED this 26th day of February, 2009.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

Scott P. Card
Matthew R. Howell
3301 N. University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
i t

RESPONDENT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 26 day of
February, 2009, to the following:

David J. Hunter
Dexter & Dexter
1360 South 740 East
Orem, Utah 84097
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ADDENDUM

A

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed.

(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by
the party to be charged with the agreement:
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making of the agreement;...

ADDENDUM

B

30 4 '.

Disposition of property

Maintenance and health care of

parties and children -- Division of debts - Court to have continuing
jurisdiction -- Custody and parent-time -- Determination of alimony -Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

(

equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable
and necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
i an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
"(ligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligation

.

liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresse

,inil

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(?) The court: may include, in an order determining child support, an
order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care
expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by
I lie employment in I MINIMI; nt I he < list orli. 11 p.irent II (he

MUM I

determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the
custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of
the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to
children born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of
divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation
rights of grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parenttime or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing
any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation
schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time
provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order
the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 fees expended by the
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition
was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a
parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the
immediate family where a visitation or

parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court
may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees
and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parenttime.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or
operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by
the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant
facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony
on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during
the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed

at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition
which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (0 The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of
the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection
(8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability
to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the

court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the
number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony,
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of
alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former
spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is
made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLORIA HAYLEY ASHBY,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Date: December 28, 2007

vs.

Case No.: 064402051

DALLEN BEN ASHBY,

Judge: Gary D. Stott

Respondent.

This case came before the Court on December 12, 2007. Both parties gave testimony and
additional evidence was received. The petitioner, Gloria Hayley Ashby, requested that she be
awarded a fair and equitable award of alimony. Exhibit 1 is a stipulation of facts that the parties
agreed to. The Court has relied on that stipulation as to some of the following information.
The parties married on December 6, 1997. Prior to this marriage, Gloria obtained an
associates degree in interior design from LDS Business College. Dallen attended Brigham Young
University during the marriage from about 1997 to 2000 and obtained a bachelor's degree in
chemical engineering. Besides going to school, he spent much of his time doing extracurricular
activities to make his application to medical school appear more competitive. Gloria worked to
support him in this effort and was the primary financial provider while he worked part-time. He was
accepted into medical school at St. Louis University. He had never applied to the University of
Utah, which was the couple's first choice for medical school because of Gloria's work in Utah 1 Ic
had procrastinated applying, missed the deadline, and told Gloria that he had not been accepted to
the school.
To support Dallen in his educational efforts at St. Louis University, Gloria had to leave

employment with Lance Turnei, hei mentoi in the interior design business

His business has

substantial value because she had allegedly been woikmg on a $12 million lemodel pioject seven
months before leaving to St Louis She fuither claimed that Lance Tuinei offered to turn ovei his
business to her She could not accept the allegedly lucrative business opportunity because she and
Dallen had to move to Missoun She explained this was a significant sacrifice and loss Glona,
howevei, offeied no cotroboiatmg testimony to validate these claims Such supposing testimony
as to hei losses would have been helpful to the Couit
Once in St Louis, Dallen attended medical school from appioximately 2000 to 2004 He
obtained school loans that paid foi tuition, books, and some living expenses each semestei Altet
obtaining a medical degiee, he participated in a medical internship at St Louis Univeisity irom
about 2004 to 2005 Dining the time in St Louis, Gloria staited hei own mtenoi design business
contiacting with designeis and aichitects, and was the pnmary financial piovidei
permanent woik because of then mutual plans foi a family

She avoided

Dallen helped hei mostly with the

busmess's accounting needs and buying material The fust year was difficult, bi t Gloria testified
that hei business became successful a^tciwaids
The two separated on oi about May 1, 2005 when Gloria moved out of the n apartment in j
she leturned to Utah where she has resided since Dallen moved to Chicago in approximately June
2005 to begin his residency He has approximately two years left to complete the i esidency and then
will do a fellowship Aftei almost eight years of man rage, Gloria fried for a Utah divorce in Octobei
200*5 At the time of tnal, Dallen was in his thud yeai of iesidency as a medical doctoi, s\as
employed by a hospital in Chicago, and will leave residency and the fellowship that follows his
residency in about 2010
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Gloria is currently employed as an interior designer She has worked in this field for about
ten years. Both Dallen and Gloria have approximately equivalent incomes of about $4,000 per
month. Their earnings and incomes are not expected to change significantly over the next thiee
years Testimony at trial established that Dallen's income will only increase about $1,000 to $2,000
per year during his fellowship Their living expenses are also approximately equal and both of them
can pay then lespective living expenses from their separate incomes. After paying for their living
expenses each month, neither one of them is able to save. The standard of living that they both
enjoy is about the same as when they were married Dallen has remarried and his new wife is
expecting a child that is due in February At the time of trial, Gloria was thirty and Dallen was
thirty-one years of age The two have no mmoi children born as issue in the maniage
Dallen plans on becoming a diagnostic radiologist as opposed to an interventional
radiologist An interventional radiologist would earn more money. Even as a diagnostic radiologist,
he expects his income will be four to five times more than what he currently earns. Both financial
expci ts at ti lal said his actual income, however, will be subject to the geographical aiea in which he
works, the place he works (whether it be a hospital, clinic, oi private practice), the area of focus he
actually practices, the length of time he will practice in that aiea, the date at which he begins the
focus area, the state of the economy, and the then-current laws governing the medical piofession
At trial. Dallen explained that in the year 2000, about two to thiee years aftei he was mamed,
he was looking at pornography Gloi la testified that she discoveied the pornography in the summer
of that year and was deeply concerned. Several months latei, m February of 2001, Gloria was
diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease Dallen complained that foi the next several yeais,
she stiongly encouraged him to seek counseling for the pornography He undertook counseling m
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Utah through LDS Family Services and through two different counseling institutions in St. Louis.
Gloria requested that he see a counselor on a weekly basis to overcome the pornography addiction.
For three months, he falsely reported to her about his ongoing treatment. He fabricated the
counselor's name, the subjects discussed, the plans they made at their weekly sessions, and the
progress he was making. A few weeks before Gloria separated from Dallen in 2005, she discovered
a locker concealing eight to ten pornographic videos. During the course of the marriage, Gloria and
Dallen both claim they had never been unfaithful in having sexual relations with others. Based on
this information, the Court finds that Dallen's conduct in viewing pornography and deceiving his
wife substantially contributed to the destruction of the marriage.
According to Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), a trial court, in setting alimony,
must attempt to provide support for the receiving spouse sufficient to maintain the spouse at the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage as nearly as possible. In determining the amount of
the award necessary to accomplish this aim, the court must make adequate findings and conclusions
demonstrating that it has considered three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the party
seeking alimony; (2) that party's ability to produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the
other party to provide support. Id. See also Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767
P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The first factor has been stipulated to by the parties. Gloria's financial condition is about
the same as Dallen's, they enjoy about the same standard of living that they had during their
marriage, they are able to meet their living expenses, and they both make about $4,000 a month.
The second factor concerning Gloria's ability to produce sufficient income is clear. Based on her
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past interior design experiences, education, and current employment status, she is capable of
producing a sufficient income to support herself. The third factor as to Dallen's ability to provide
support has been established as he makes about $4,000 a month. Although he cannot save, he can
presumably provide some support by cutting expenses, managing his money well, and being more
frugal. In the balance, these factors militate against awarding alimony.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a), the court shall consider at least the following
factors in determining alimony: (1) the length of the marriage; (2) whether the recipient spouse has
custody of minor children requiring support; (3) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (4) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed
to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. Here, the marriage lasted almost
eight years, there are no children, Gloria did not work in a business owned or operated by Dallen,
and she contributed directly to Dallen's increase in skill by allowing him to attend school during the
marriage while being the primary financial provider. The fourth factor is the only one that militates
in favor of awarding alimony. The Court notes, however, that Dallen's circumstances have allowed
Gloria to gain substantial occupational experiences in the interior design field. Not only has she
worked with established interior design companies and on an allegedly multi-million dollar project,
but she has also obtained skills in doing so that have enabled her to start her own business, which,
by her own account, became a success.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c), as a general rule in determining alimony, the
court should look to the standard of living existing at the time of separation. The Code also states
that the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles. Id. When a marriage of long
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duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in determining the amount of alimony.
Id. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in awarding alimony. Id.
Generally, alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed. Id. Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
death of that former spouse. Id.
Here, the standard of living existing at the time of separation has not changed significantly
The mamage lasted almost eight years. Seven years is clearly a mamage of "short" duration. Boyle
v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("the marriage lasted only 7 years, and the short
marriage resulted in a diminution of the wife's assets."). The Court finds, therefore, that the
marriage here is one of short duration. Both Dallen's and Gloria's earning capacities have been
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage. The Court finds, though, that the
testimony at trial by both the parties' financial experts established that Dallen's future income
cannot be predicted with any reasonable degree of probability. According to Osguthorpe v.
Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), it is well within the court's discretion to determine
that Dallen has the ability to earn more money. Relying on evidence sufficiently detailed in its
findings of fact, a trial court will not abuse its discretion in imputing income to the defendant spouse
for purposes of determining an alimony award. Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App.
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1996). Because Dallcn has a medical degree,1 is doing his medical residency, and will be
completing a fellowship in the next few years, he has the ability to earn more money than he is
presently earning as a result of both their efforts. Based only on these facts, however, the Court
cannot reasonably impute any specific amount of income.
When questioned about the duration of the alimony she had in mind, Gloria said she wanted
it to continue beyond remarriage. She believes she has a right to her husband's advanced degree,
that she greatly enhanced his earning capacity, that she made substantial employment sacrifices, and
that his fault in destroying the marriage justify the ongoing award. Under Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(8)(b), the court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. The Court has
found that Dallen is at fault because his interest in pornography and untruthfulness to Gloria
substantially contributed to the destruction of the marriage. This factor militates in favor of
awarding alimony, yet the way Gloria envisions it, a fair and equitable alimony would punish Dallen
for his misconduct, reward her for the sacrifices she has made for him, and serve as a continuing
entitlement to his medical degree, which she believes she has rights to, even after she remarries.
These, however, are not the purposes of alimony. The puipose of alimony is to provide support for
the wife, not to reward her or to inflict a penalty upon the husband. English v. English, 565 P.2d
409 (Utah 1977). She needs no support, she may not be rewarded for her sacrifices and Dallen may
not be penalized by alimony.
Gloria's idea of alimony is essentially the same as the concept of "equitable restitution" that
the Utah Supreme Court struck down in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). There,

Petersen v Peteiseiu 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987). an adxanced degree is oi confers an intangible right
which, because of its character, cannot propeily be characterized as property subject to division between the spouses.
Traditional alimony analysis is the appropriate and adequate method for making adjustments between the parties in
the cases of this type, Raybum v Raybunu 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct. App. 1987): an advanced degree or professional
license is not marital property subject to division upon divorce. However, an advanced degree often accompanies a
disparity in earning potential that is appropriately considered as a factor in alimony analysis.
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the husband went through medical school. Four years after his graduation, he and his wife were
divorced. After she appealed her limited award of alimony, among other things, the court concluded
that she should have been better compensated. She had "earned an award of some permanent
financial benefit, in her own right, that will allow her to share in the economic benefits achieved
through their joint efforts" and that her husband's earning capacity "must be recognized in
fashioning those legal and equitable remedies necessary to assist the plaintiff to readjust her life."
Id. at 539 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the appellate court created a new type of
interest that it termed "equitable restitution." Id. at 539-540.
The Supreme Court, however, struck down the findings as to "equitable restitution." First,
a marriage "is not comparable to a commercial partnership" and the efforts each spouse makes "for
the other and for their common marital interests cannot be quantified in monetary terms, their
respective contributions netted out, and a balance struck at the termination of the marriage." Id. at
540. It explained, "The very idea of marriage contemplates mutual effort and mutual sacrifice." Id.
The second reason was because "an award of equitable restitution would be extraordinarily
speculative." Id. at 541. And the third reason was because an equitable restitution award based on
a medical degree was "essentially indistinguishable" from valuing it as a property interest, which
is improper. Id.
Based on Martinez and for the additional findings set forth above, Gloria's request for
alimony cannot be sustained because under the circumstances here, it would operate like
compensation to a business partner. Any amount of alimony based on Darren's enhanced earning
capacity would be too speculative because his future income cannot be predicted with any degree
of reasonable probability. And awarding her alimony because of the medical degree he earned
during the marriage would essentially be giving her property rights in his advanced degree, which

Page 8 of 9

is not recognized under the law. Counsel for Respondent shall prepare the appropriate Findings and
Order and submit them for this Court's signature.
Dated this a^

day

u

oLX^MUUP^1^2^

Judge Gary D. St6tt
Fourth Judicial District Court
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